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Chapter Eleven 
The Obama Presidency 
A Foreign Policy of Change? 
James M. McCormick 
Barack Obama ran for the presidency on a policy of change-change in do-
mestic policy and change in foreign policy. During both the nomination and 
election campaigns, this focus on change was the overarching theme that he 
struck at virtually every stop on the campaign trail. In foreign policy, Can-
didate Obama's emphasis on change focused on an array of issues-ending 
the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars and bringing American troops home; "reset-
ting" and "restarting" American relations with allies and other major powers 
throughout the world; engaging with adversaries to address a number of out-
standing issues; and dealing with global economic and military issues, most 
notably nuclear proliferation. The larger aim of this "change" emphasis was to 
enable the United States to reengage with the world and to move away from 
the isolated position that America found itself after the seeming unilateralist 
policies of the Bush administration. In this chapter, we examine the foreign 
policy approach and policies of the Obama administration and assess how well 
it has achieved this change. 
VALUES AND BELIEFS OF 
THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION 
The foreign policy approach that emerged during Obama's presidency was 
one that appeared to align closely with the liberal internationalist approach to 
foreign policy (albeit with some realist exceptions). This approach bas a sub-
stantial heritage in American foreign policy, dating back at least to Woodrow 
Wilson and Franklin Delano Roosevelt, but it has also found more recent ex-
pression in foreign policy elements of the Carter and Clinton administrations. 
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A LIBERAL INTERNATIONALIST APPROACH 
A liberal internationalist approach is one that is grounded in a number of core 
values and beliefs about the motivations and aims of foreign policy behavior 
for individual states and for the United States in particular. First of all, key do-
mestic values, such as the promotion of democracies and individual freedoms, 
are viewed as important ways to create a stable and peaceful international 
order. In this context, the Obama approach would find appeal among those 
who see the "democratic peace" theory as the way to global order. Following 
this tradition, too, the basis of US foreign policy would flow directly from its 
domestic values as a nation, even as the United States works to promote such 
values internationally. Second, liberal internationalism calls for promoting in-
ternational cooperation and interdependence in a variety of ways as a means to 
knit states and peoples today in a web of interdependence to address common 
problems and reduce the risk of conflict. In this sense, the United States would 
promote free trade among nations, but it also would promote cooperative ac-
tions across borders by different levels of government and among numerous 
civil society groups. Third, international law and international institutions are 
assumed to "have a modernizing and civilizing effect on states" and also fit 
within this liberal internationalist tradition for enhancing global cooperation 
and interdependence (on Wilsonianism and this quote, see Ikenberry 2008). In 
this way, American foreign policy would utilize regional and global organiza-
tions, since they, too, are essential in tying states and the international com-
munity together. Fourth, and particularly important from this perspective and 
its Wilsonian roots, the United States would not only stay involved in global 
affairs, but it would assist in bringing about a stable, liberal order through 
its cooperative and constructive leadership efforts. Moreover, these actions 
would not be done in any top-down or directive way; instead, they would be 
evoked through cooperative actions with states and actors. 
In several respects, liberal internationalism stands in considerable contrast 
to the foreign policy approach of the George W. Bush administration, an 
approach variously described as a combination of "defensive realism" and 
"idealism, "revival Wilsonianism," or neoconservatism (McCormick 2010, 
212- 13). A liberal internationalist approach begins from a more cooperative 
assumption about foreign policy and global politics than the Bush adminis-
tration adopted, especially after the events of September 11 , when President 
Bush announced that "either you are with us or you are with the terrorists" 
(quoted in McCormick 20 I 0, 214). This approach also emphasizes the utility 
of multilateral means to address foreign policy, an approach that the Bush 
administration generally viewed skeptically from the outset of its tenure. In 
this sense, the Obama approach places greater reliance on diplomacy and 
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"soft power" instruments for achieving foreign policy change and thus stands 
in marked distinction from the Bush administration's seeming reliance on 
coercive diplomacy and "hard power" instruments. 
At least two important similarities in goals, however, exist between 
Obama 's liberal internationalist and Bush's neoconservative approaches. 
Both approaches favor the fostering of democracies, and both call for Ameri-
can leadership. Yet, they differ substantially on how best to achieve these 
goals. The Obama approach focuses on building democracy from the bottom 
up, while the Bush approach sought, at least in practice, to impose it from 
the top down. Both approaches also favor American leadership, but again, 
they differ on how to pursue that goal. The Obama approach calls for more 
cooperative leadership ("partnerships" as the Obama administration continu-
ously describes it), while the Bush administration favored a more assertive 
American leadership to encourage followership. 
THE GLOBAL VISION: A MULTI-PARTNER WORLD 
A more precise foreign policy framework for the Obama administration, 
closely aligned to the campaign themes, emerged during the first year of the 
administration and took even fuller shape by the middle of the second year 
in office. In his 2009 inaugural address, for example, President Obama once 
again alluded to this change in foreign policy from the Bush years with an ex-
plicit promotion of American values as the basis of policy and with an appeal 
for diplomacy toward adversaries: "We reject as false the choice between 
our safety and our ideals . ... Those ideals still light the world, and we will 
not give them up for expedience's sake," and, "To those who cling to power 
through corruption and deceit and the silencing of dissent, know that you are 
on the wrong side of history, but we will extend a hand if you are willing to 
unclench your fist." Yet, he also signaled a continuation of past foreign policy 
in this way: "We will not apologize for our way of life nor will we waver in 
its defense. And for those who seek to advance their aims by inducing terror 
and slaughtering innocents, we say to you now that, 'Our spirit is stronger 
and cannot be broken. You cannot outlast us, and we will defeat you. " ' As 
Stanley Renshon (20 I 0, 7-8) correctly pointed out for us (and from which we 
draw), the former set of statements would appeal to liberals (and liberal inter-
nationalists in our parlance), while the latter set of statements would appeal to 
conservatives and political realists. In all , although change was in the air, the 
degree of change was again mixed with a commitment to continuity in policy. 
During the first several months of the administration, President Obarna's 
foreign policy team conducted a policy review. The results of that review were 
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announced through a series of presidential speeches that President Obama gave 
from April to July 2009 in several world capitals in differing parts of the world 
(Europe, the Middle East, and Africa). In April 2009 in Prague, the Czech Re-
public, he extolled the virtues of the changes that have occurred in that country 
in a few short years and caJied for cooperation and policy coordination among 
nations "to renew our prosperity" and "to provide for our common security." 
He also set out his goal of "a world without nuclear weapons" and outlined a 
series of steps to move in that direction by completing a new Strategic Arms 
Reduction Treaty with Russia, strengthening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT), and initiating "a new international effort to secure all vulnerable 
nuclear material around the world within four years." In June 2009 in Cairo, 
Egypt, President Obama called for "a new beginning between the United States 
and Muslims; one based on mutual interest and mutual respect" and sought to 
show the substantial ties between the Muslim world and the United States over 
the decades and centuries. Importantly, he called for "a sustained effort to listen 
to each other; to Jearn from each other; to respect one another; and to seek com-
mon ground," and he went on to state that "our problems must be dealt with 
through partnership; [and] our progress must be shared." 
In July 2009, President Obama gave foreign policy speeches in two 
other capitals-one in Moscow, Russia, the other in Accra, Ghana. In both 
speeches, he sought to reach out to these differing audiences and to highlight 
the change in American policy that he wanted to initiate. In Moscow, Presi-
dent Obama called for a '"reset' in relations between the United States and 
Russia." The aim, he said, would be "a sustained effort among the American 
and Russian people to identify mutual interests, and expand dialogue and 
cooperation that can pave the way to progress." Finally, in Accra, President 
Obama once again struck this theme of international cooperation and part-
nership: "I see Africa as a fundamental part of our interconnected world- as 
partners with America on behalf of the future we want for all of our children." 
In that speech, he particularly focused on issues relating to the needs of Africa 
and the developing world: the need for democratic governments, develop-
ment that provides opportunity, governance that strengthens public health, 
and the peaceful resolution of conflicts. In all these areas, the United States 
would stand as "partners" with Africa. 
At roughly the same time, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton delivered an 
important foreign policy address at home. In that address, she committed the 
United States to a leadership position, albeit a particular kind, identified the 
basic values to inform the Obama administration's foreign policy priorities, 
outlined how the administration would conduct its foreign policy, and crys-
tallized the view of the kind of international system that the administration 
wished to create. In particular, she stated that the United States would continue 
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to lead in global affairs, but the nation "need[ s] a new mindset about how 
America will use its power to safeguard our nation, expand shared prosperity, 
and help more people in more places live up to their God-given potential" 
(Clinton 2009b ). 
In particular, she rejected the approaches of the past and committed the 
administration to working toward "a different global architecture" to address 
the common challenges and threats in the world today. Importantly, Secretary 
Clinton said that Americans will 
use our power to convene, our ability to coJUlect countries around the world, and 
sound foreign policy strategies to create partnerships aimed at solving problems. 
We'll go beyond states to create opportunities for non-state actors and individu-
als to contribute to solutions. . .. In short, we will lead by inducing greater 
cooperation among a greater number of actors and reducing competition, tilting 
the balance away from a multi-polar world and toward a multi-partner world. 
(Clinton 2009b, emphasis added) 
Secretary Clinton also incorporated an important realist exception to her "fo-
cus on diplomacy and development" as a basic approach. When the United 
States is threatened, she said, "We will not hesitate to defend our friends, 
our interests, and above all, our people vigorously and when necessary with 
the world's strongest military." In other words, the unilateral option of self-
reliance is still very much available. 
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY: 
"A STRATEGY OF ENGAGEMENT" 
The national security strategy statement of May 20 I 0 (White House 20 I 0), 
from which the following discussion is drawn, summarized the foreign policy 
approach of the Obama administration. Its "strategic approach," the admin-
istration declared, was grounded in three fundamental ideas: (I) the need to 
rebuild the American economy as the basis for strong global leadership, (2) a 
commitment to living American values at home in order to credibly promote 
them abroad, and (3) a commitment to reshaping the international system in 
a way that it will enable the global community to address the challenges of 
the twenty-first century. To actualize these ideas, the overarching strategy by 
the United States would be a "strategy of engagement." 
Such widespread engagement would be utilized to address four principal 
goals in order to "achieve the world we seek": (1) achieve and maintain se-
curity for the United States, allies, and partners; (2) rebuild and strengthen 
the American economy through an open international system "that promotes 
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opportunity and prosperity;" (3) promote universal values abroad; and (4) 
work toward an international order "that can foster collective action to 
confront common challenges." Each of these four areas requires the United 
States to address specific issues to realize these principal goals and the na-
tional security strategy discussed each in turn. 
Security 
The first major goal for the United States is to address multiple security 
threats of the current era. These new threats range from "a loose network 
of violent extremists," the dangers posed by failing states, and the spread 
of nuclear weapons. In addition, though, these threats include "asymmetric" 
ones in which adversaries target outer space and cyberspace as ways to harm 
and undermine American (and, indeed, global) society. 
For each of these threats, the Obama administration outlined its proposed 
course of actions. For terrorism, the administration called for developing a 
greater domestic capacity to address emergencies at home, and it remained 
committed "to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaida and its affiliates" 
abroad in partnership with others. For the threat of nuclear and biological 
weapons, the administration called for strengthening the NPT, creating a 
nuclear-free Korean peninsula through the denuclearization ofNorth Korea, 
and compelling Iran to move away from its pursuit of nuclear weapons. Fur-
thermore, the administration would also seek to secure all "vulnerable nuclear 
weapons and materials" and counter the potential of biological weapons. For 
the threat from failing states and unresolved conflicts, the administration 
called for a "responsible transition" as the United States ended the war in 
Iraq, endorsed a two-state solution for the Arab-Israel conflict, remained open 
to offering Iran "a pathway to a better future, provided Iran's leaders are pre-
pared to take it," and offered to aid states transitioning from recent conflicts. 
Finally, on the threat to cyberspace, the administration vowed to work with 
the private sector and with other governments "to investigate cyber intrusion 
and to ensure an organized and unified response to future cyber incidents." 
Importantly, the administration was careful to specify its position on the 
use of force in addressing the terrorist threats. Although the national strategy 
statement indicates that the use of force "may be necessary to defend our 
country and allies and to preserve broader peace and security," the admin-
istration is careful to specify that it "will exhaust other options before war 
whenever we can, and carefully weigh the costs and risks of action against 
costs and risks of inaction." The strategy of the Obama administration is 
more circumspect in the use of force than the strategy outlined by the Bush 
administration in its 2002 national security strategy. 
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Prosperity 
The second major goal of the national security strategy is to rebuild and 
strengthen the American economy as the basis for a continuing leadership 
role in the world. The statement outlines actions, both domestically and inter-
nationally, that must be done to accomplish this goal. Domestically, the ad-
ministration calls for improvement in the quality of American education from 
the elementary through the university level. The statement also commits the 
administration to "support programs that cultivate interest and scholarship in 
foreign languages and intercultural affairs," and to comprehensive immigra-
tion reform as a way to improve America's human capital. Finally, the United 
States must reduce the nation's deficit, reform the contracting process within 
the government to reduce waste and inefficiency, and increase the level of 
transparency, so that the public can more fully follow how the taxpayers' 
dollars are being spent. 
InternationaJiy, the United States must expand the growth of the "inte-
grated, global economy," even as it addresses the "economic imbalances 
and financial excesses." The national security strategy statement calls on 
Americans to spend less and save more, double American exports by 2014, 
and take more actions to open up markets for American products. The Obama 
administration will also support the G-20 nations' "emergence as the premier 
forum for international economic cooperation" in the global community, and 
will provide leadership to that organization, the International Monetary Fund, 
and the World Bank in making necessary global financial reforms. Finally, 
the administration called for economic changes in developing economies, 
although those changes should de done within the context of "long-term de-
velopment" and "sustainable development." 
Values 
The third major goal of the national security strategy is the promotion of 
key fundamental values. These values are the basic fundamental individual 
freedoms contained in the US constitution that the Obama administration 
believes are universal and important to promote globally. In order to make 
the promotion of these values legitimate around the world, they need to be 
respected at home. In this sense, the United States must prohibit the use of 
torture against individuals and must adhere to the rule of law in its actions, 
including in dealing with terrorism. Abroad, the United States will promote 
democracy and human rights "because governments that respect these values 
are more just, peaceful, and legitimate." Yet, the United States "will not im-
pose any system of government on another country." Instead, it will support 
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and build the capacity of those states pursuing democratic development. Such 
assistance will be undertaken both through working directly with other gov-
ernments and also working through civil society groups to create and expand 
key democratic institutions. Finally, the Obama administration indicated that 
its emphasis on global freedom also meant "freedom from want," and that it 
would promote a new global health initiative, promote greater food security, 
and continue to respond to global humanitarian crises. 
International Order 
The final goal outlined in the national security statement is the establishment 
of "a just and sustainable international order that can foster collective action 
to confront common challenges." The Obama administration views this com-
ponent of the national security strategy as crucial to the advancement of the 
earlier three goals. 
To bring about this new order, the national security strategy statement calls 
on a long litany of American actions and priorities. The United States will 
sustain its security relations with America's traditional allies in Europe, Asia, 
and North America; build cooperative relations with those that are the "21st 
Century Centers oflnfluence" (e.g., China, India, and Russia); and expand its 
ties with the G-20 nations (e.g., Indonesia, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, Argentina, 
South Africa, and South Korea). In addition, the United States will work to 
strengthen the United Nations, devolve some responsibility for collective 
action to a variety of international institutions, and invest in strengthening 
the capacity of regional organizations across the globe as a way to enhance 
worldwide security. 
The ultimate test of this new international order, the national security strat-
egy points out, is the ability to obtain global cooperation to address the current 
system challenges. Such challenges range from climate change, ethnic and 
genocidal conflict to global pandemics, transnational criminal syndicates, and 
issues of the "global commons"- shared seas, air, and space among nations. 
No one state could adequately address these issues; hence, the administration 
would work to achieve collective action within the international community. 
THE OBAMA WORLD VIEW IN OPERATION 
The foreign policy approach of the Obama administration is broad, compre-
hensive, and ambitious in conception- and considerably at variance with the 
Bush administration approach. In this sense, the Obama approach represents 
a dramatic change in foreign policy orientation. The important question, how-
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ever, is whether this approach has had any impact in the first two years. How 
much of this approach has been implemented? Has the approach changed 
the substance of American foreign policy? Has this approach yielded greater 
foreign policy success than its predecessor in addressing key issues? 
IMPROVING AMERICA'S GLOBAL IMAGE 
In terms of reengaging the United States with the international community, 
the Obama approach has surely changed from the Bush administration. Presi-
dent Obama made important foreign policy speeches in key capitals across 
different continents and regions- Europe, Africa, and the Middle East- in 
an effort to reach out to the world and improve America's image. He has also 
engaged key world leaders in bilateral diplomatic summits (e.g., with Russian 
president Medvedev) and in a variety of multilateral forums (e.g., the G-8, the 
G-20, APEC). Furthermore, his administration has appointed a large number 
of special envoys to address a broad range of global issues, whether over 
Darfur, Afghanistan, North Korea, the Middle East, or elsewhere. Finally, 
and importantly, the United States has increased its use of regional and inter-
national organizations in pursuit of its foreign policy goals. In all , the efforts 
at global engagement have been substantial and pervasive during the early 
years of the Obama administration. 
lndeed, this engagement, and the president's personal popularity world-
wide, has had an effect on America's image abroad. In Pew Research Center 
polls in 2009 and 20 lO across twenty-five and twenty-two countries, respec-
tively, the "US favorability rating" improved considerably in most countries 
surveyed (Pew Global Attitudes Project 2009, 20 10). The greatest improve-
ment occurred in Western European countries (Britain, France, Germany, 
and Spain), but the view of America was also more positive, particularly in 
Latin American, African, and Asian nations. On another question in the 2009 
survey, which asks whether Obama "will do the right thing in world affairs," 
large majorities across the respondents in the surveyed countries were now 
more confident that President Obama would do so as compared to the results 
for a similar question for President Bush in 2008. The absolute levels for this 
"do the right thing" question in the 20 I 0 survey continued to show consid-
erable confidence in President Obama for most of the countries surveyed, 
although the percentages across all the countries were systematically lower 
than in 2009. In this sense, some confidence in President Obama's actions 
had begun to erode. 
Yet, the global attitudinal change witnessed in numerous countries has not 
occurred in most Muslim countries. Generally the Muslim countries included 
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in these surveys continued to hold negative views when measured on the US 
favorability scale or on the "do the right thing" question. In Turkey, Egypt, 
Jordan, Lebanon, Pakistan, and the Palestinian territories in the 2009 Pew 
survey, for example, an overwhelming number of respondents continued to 
have a negative view of the United States, and they expressed low levels of 
confidence in President Obama "doing the right thing." Such patterns contin-
ued for the 201 0 survey results and actually eroded for that year. 
Keeping these exceptions about Muslim countries in mind and some ero-
sion of confidence in other countries, as well, these results still suggest that 
President Obama improved the perception of the United States in the global 
arena. In this sense, this aspect of the global "soft power" quotient of the 
United States has improved under the Obama administration. But has this im-
provement in America's soft-power quotient been translated into agreement 
or accommodation with American foreign policy, either among the global 
publics or policymakers? 
The evidence appears mixed. The 20 I 0 Pew survey results indicate that 
majorities in about half of the twenty-two countries now support the anti-
terrorism policies of Obama, but majorities in many of these same countries 
continue to oppose the war in Afghanistan. On Obama's policy toward Iran, 
majorities or pluralities in about half of the surveyed countries oppose it, 
and on Obama 's handling of the Middle East conflict, most of the countries 
opposed his policy. Yet, on some important global commons issues (e.g., 
climate change, the world economic crisis, and Obama's overall international 
perfonnance ), the majority or plurality of respondents in fourteen or more of 
the twenty-two countries voiced their approval (Pew Global Attitudes Project 
2010, 4-5). Still, the overall conclusion is that President Obama's popularity 
among the global publics has not fostered unifonn support for his policies. 
The same conclusion applies when considering the reaction of policymak-
ers around the globe to his policy efforts. Whether seeking NATO nations to 
maintain or increase their troops in Afghanistan, urging the European Union 
nations to stimulate their economies, or seeking to prod greater support from 
China over North Korean or Iranian nuclear ambitions, Obama's global popu-
larity has not automatically produced policy support from these leaders during 
the first two years of his administration. Instead, national interests continue 
to dominate policy choices by these nations and their leaders. Perhaps the 
greatest series of rebuffs to President Obama's policy efforts occurred during 
his trip to Asia in November 2010 (Chan, Stolberg, and Sanger 2010). At a 
meeting just prior to the G-20 summit, the United States and South Korea had 
hoped to conclude a free-trade agreement that had languished since the Bush 
administration. Instead, the two sides could not agree and could only insist 
that they would conclude the pact "in a matter of weeks." (Despite this initial 
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setback, though, they did reach an accord in early December 20 I 0 to elimi-
nate a number of important trade barriers between the two countries [Chan 
20 I 0]). Shortly afterward at the G-20 meetings, President Obama failed to get 
support for his proposal to stimulate global growth before working on deficit 
reduction from some key trading nations (e.g., China, Britain, Germany, and 
Brazil). He also failed to get any movement from the Chinese on its overval-
ued currency. Instead, several countries criticized the decision of the Federal 
Reserve for weakening the US dollar through pumping an additional $600 
billion into circulation (and thus potentially hurting the attractiveness of their 
exports). Policymakers of other nations pursuing their own interests in for-
eign policy- and thus disagreeing with American policy at times- is hardly 
surprising, but their actions suggest the limitation that a change in reputation 
may have on support for American policy abroad. In short, nations (both 
publics and their leaders) continue to disagree with American policy, albeit 
perhaps less vocally than during the Bush years. 
INCORPORATING DOMESTIC VALUES IN FOREIGN POLICY: 
GUANTANAMO BAY AND THE ARAB SPRING 
A second area where the Obama approach called for policy change was in the 
incorporation of domestic values in the conduct of American foreign policy. 
Indeed, President Obama noted that the United States did not need to com-
promise its values in carrying out its foreign policy. Rather, he argued, "in 
the long run we ... cannot keep this country safe unless we enlist the power 
of our most fundamental values." His implicit reference, of course, was to the 
Bush administration's actions toward the treatment of suspected terrorists in 
seeming violation of domestic and international standards. Hence, one of his 
first actions as president, just two days after his inauguration, was the issu-
ance of three executive orders to reverse some of these actions. One executive 
order called for the closing of overseas prisons by the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) and the elimination of certain interrogation methods in dealing 
with terrorist suspects; a second directed the closing of the detention camp 
at Guantanamo Bay within a year's time; and the third set up a special inter-
agency task force "to identify lawful options for the disposition of individuals 
captured or apprehended in connection with armed conflicts and counterter-
rorism operations" (see Executive Orders 13491 , 13492, and 13493 2009). 
Despite these orders, however, the administration has been only partially 
successful in implementing a change in policy. The interrogation measures, 
based on only those outlined in the Army Field Manual, have now been ad-
hered to, and the use of water boarding, a practice that had been used over 
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three hundred times during the Bush administration, no longer occurs. The full 
implementation of the other directives, however, has encountered difficulty, 
and indeed, not all aspects of the executive orders have been fully brought 
into effect. To be sure, CIA Director Leon Panetta announced in April 2009 
that overseas prisons operated by the organization have been closed (Shane 
2009a), but the transfer of prisoners to facilities operated by other countries 
apparently would continue, although outside "contractors" will not be used to 
question the suspects ("CIA Claims to Close Secret Prisons" 2009). 
The effort to close the Guantanamo Bay prison facility and, in particular, to 
transfer its prisoners elsewhere has met with considerable resistance. While 
the administration was able to locate a domestic facility to take these prison-
ers (an empty maximum security prison in Illinois), the Congress has blocked 
funding to renovate that facility, fearful of housing suspected terrorists on 
American soil (Welna 2009). Furthermore, public opposition to the closing of 
the Guantanamo facility remains significant with 60 percent of the American 
public in a March 20 I 0 poll supporting keeping it open (Savage 20 I 0). The 
administration has also had to move back from its original position that it 
would transfer all detainees at Guantanamo to other prisons or put them on 
trial. Indeed, as early as May 2009, President Obama acknowledged that his 
administration would continue to use military commissions to try some pris-
oners held at Guantanamo, despite earlier opposition to such action, and that 
he did not have an answer to those "detainees at Guantanamo who cannot be 
prosecuted yet who pose a clear danger to the American people." In this sense, 
these latter prisoners are likely to remain at Guantanamo for the foreseeable 
future. Furthermore, with the thwarted attacks on Christmas Day 2009 and 
on Times Square in May 2010, the prospects of closing Guantanamo have 
continued to fade, and it is now "unlikely that President Obama will fulfill his 
promise to close it before his term ends in 20 13" (Savage 20 I 0). Indeed, the 
status of indefinite detention at Guantanamo and the use of indefinite deten-
tions were confirmed by the Obama administration in March 20 II, when the 
president issued a new executive order confirming these policies- an order 
that ironically appeared directly at variance with the ones issued after his 
inauguration in January 2009 (Tapper and Miller 2011). Yet, one official re-
mained upbeat about the current situation and its effect on public (and global) 
opinion: "Closing Guantanamo is good, but fighting to close Guantanamo is 
O.K. Admitting you failed would be the worst" (Savage 2010). 
In contrast to its seemingly failed efforts to infuse American values into its 
policy in dealing with Guantanamo Bay, the administration acted much more 
consistently and decisively with its commitment to promoting American val-
ues with the emergence ofthe "Arab Spring" in early 2011. The Arab Spring 
referred to a groundswell of popular movements for democratic reform in 
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several Arab countries. The movement began in Tunisia in which the long-
serving leader was ultimately forced into exile after several days of popular 
protests in January 20 II. The movement spread to Egypt with days of public 
protests against the thirty-year autocratic rule of President Hosni Mubarak, 
an important U.S. ally in the Middle East peace process. The administration 
thus faced an important crossroads with this uprising: whether to support 
interests that it wanted to protect or support values that it wanted to promote. 
Although the administration was a bit indecisive in the opening days of the 
Egyptian public protests, President Obama ultimately called for the departure 
of President Mubarak. And indeed by mid-February 20 II , Mubarak gave up 
his post, and an effort at democratic transition was underway in that crucial 
Middle Eastern country, albeit not without difficulty. 
As this Arab Spring swept other states in the Middle East, the Obama 
administration continued to support these democratic reform efforts- some-
times more pronounced than others. The most dramatic effort by the Obama 
administration was in Libya and the effort by opposition forces to end the 
forty-year rule by Moarnrnar Gadhafi. As protests increased and the rebel 
forces in Libya began to advance, Gadhafi threatened to destroy these forces, 
with the potential of great loss of innocent lives. President Obama undertook 
a series of actions to stop these efforts by Gadhafi's forces. He evacuated 
the American embassy and froze Gadhafi's assets in the United States (NPR 
20 II). Furthermore, working with allies, the administration succeeded in 
broadening international sanctions through United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 1970 (United Nations Security Council 20 II a) against the Libyan 
government and imposing a "no-fly zone" over Libya through United Nations 
Security Council 1973 (United Nations Security Council 2011 b). The latter 
resolution also included a provision authorizing the member states to "to take 
all necessary measures" to protect civilians in that country. In large measure, 
these actions were fully consistent with the "Responsibility to Protect" doc-
trine endorsed by the global community in 2005 (International Coalition for 
the Responsibility to Protect 20 II). As a result, the administration, as part 
of a NATO-led coalition, moved to enforce the UN resolution, although the 
United States had European nations largely take the lead. Some opposition to 
this administration action was voiced at home, since these analysts were not 
convinced that American interests were at stake in Libya. Indeed, in outlin-
ing his policy actions, President Obama (NPR 20 II) argued otherwise: "To 
brush aside America's responsibility as a leader and- more profoundly-our 
responsibilities to our fellow human beings under such circumstances would 
have been a betrayal of who we are." In this sense, President Obama's Libyan 
policy was carefully legitimized through its adherence to the American do-
mestic values. 
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ADDRESSING KEY SECURITY ISSUES: 
IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN, IRAN, AND NORTH KOREA 
The Obama administration inherited several security issues from the Bush 
administration, and it promised a change policy on them, as well. In dealing 
with the Iraq War, the administration has surely changed courses, but in ad-
dressing the Afghanistan War, it has not. On the nuclear threats from North 
Korea and Iran, the administration has attempted an engagement approach 
but with very little success so far. In all , the degree of change in either the 
substance or the success on the latter three issues has been limited. 
Iraq 
Perhaps the most important policy change that Candidate Obama promised 
during his campaign was to end American involvement in Iraq. He has 
largely succeeded in that effort. Early on, he called for ending all American 
combat operations by August 31, 2010, with only 50,000 trainers and advis-
ers remaining in Iraq by that date, and he promised the withdrawal of all 
American forces by the end of 2011. The former goal has been achieved, and 
the latter seems in sight. One factor that may change these plans is the con-
tinued instability of the Iraqi government. Since March 2010 elections, the 
various Iraqi factions have had difficulty putting together an effective coali-
tion government. If that situation were to continue, it may have some effect 
on the final drawdown of American forces. The administration, however, 
has already removed a great deal of American military equipment from Iraq, 
although the Obama administration's exact plans for American involvement 
in Iraq after 2011 remain unclear (Myers, Shanker, and Healy 2010, I, 19). 
In all , Iraq represents a good example of the Obama approach in action and 
largely a departure from the Bush approach, although the 2011 withdrawal 
was originally negotiated by the earlier administration (Myers, Shanker, and 
Healy 20 I 0, I). 
Afghanistan 
If Iraq represents a movement away from the Bush approach by the Obama 
administration, its policy toward Afghanistan appears to be pursuing a course 
similar to the Bush administration's in Iraq beginning in 2007. To be sure, 
Candidate Obama had always said that the real threat from international ter-
rorism was in Afghanistan and that the Bush administration had "taken its 
eye off the ball" with the Iraq War ("Obama to Couric" 2009). As a result, 
President Obama quickly committed two additional brigades to Afghanistan, 
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increased the number of American drone attacks against terrorist camps, both 
in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and appointed a new commander in Afghani-
stan, General Stanley McChrystal, who was ordered to conduct a review of 
Afghanistan policy and strategy. General McChrystal completed that review 
in late summer 2009, and his principal recommendation to the president was 
the need for a substantial increase in American military forces if there was to 
be a chance of success. 
McChrystal ' s report became a source of considerable internal debate be-
tween Obama and his national security team over the next several months. At 
the end of this debate- in which the president believed he had only received 
one real option (i.e., increasing the number of American troops)-the presi-
dent largely supported the military's position (see Woodward 2010). That is, 
he ordered thirty thousand more American troops- somewhat less than the 
forty thousand requested- and opted for pursuing a counterinsurgency op-
tion (as the military preferred). In ordering both the size of the troop increase 
and in adopting the counterinsurgency strategy, the policy choice--a "surge 
strategy"-seemed closely aligned to what President Bush had chosen in 
Iraq in early 2007. Indeed, the parallelism became complete a few months 
later when General McChrystal resigned (over some critical remarks about 
administration officials in Rolling Stone magazine) and was replaced by 
General David Petraeus, who had carried out the surge strategy in Iraq for 
the Bush administration. Still, some important differences did exist between 
the Obama surge strategy and the Bush strategy. In announcing his decision 
at West Point in 2009, President Obama tied the strategy to a commitment 
to begin withdrawing American troops from Afghanistan in July 20 II. Im-
portantly, though, he conditioned the withdrawal of forces on "taking into 
account conditions on the grounds." Furthermore, this military approach was 
linked to a civilian strategy to enhance the effectiveness of the Afghan gov-
ernment and a partnership with Pakistan building on "mutual interest, mutual 
respect, and mutual trust." 
The new military strategy was implemented with some initial success, ac-
cording to the administration's one-year review (Michaels 20 10). The civilian 
strategy within Afghanistan and the relationship with Pakistan, however, have 
not improved appreciably in the first year since the president' s announce-
ment. Indeed, the stability and effectiveness of the Afghan government has 
remained an area of concern, as has the continued ties between Pakistani 
military intelligence and elements supportive of the Taliban and al-Qaida. The 
Obama administration has now once again adjusted its timetable for Ameri-
can withdrawal from that conflict. The administration remains committed to 
transferring some security responsibility to the Afghan army during 2011 and 
2012, but it will now continue the American combat mission there until 2014. 
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At the NATO summit in November 20 I 0, the alliance outlined a plan to stay 
in Afghanistan through 2014, as well. Significantly, the similarity between the 
strategies in Afghanistan and in Iraq for the two administrations was acknowl-
edged by an anonymous American official in late 2010: "Iraq is a pretty decent 
blueprint for how to transition in Afghanistan" (Baker and Nordland 20 I 0). 
Whether this Afghanistan timetable will be altered as a result of American 
covert military action in May 2011 that found and killed Osama bin Laden, 
the head of ai-Qaeda and the perpetrator of the September 11, 2001, attacks, 
remains unclear. In a covert operation that reportedly had been in process 
since August 2010, American intelligence had seemingly located the head of 
ai-Qaeda (although the bin Laden identity had not been fully determined until 
the actual attack) in Abbottabad, a Pakistani city with a large military instal-
lation and academy that's close to the capital. On May I, 2011, a contingent 
of American Navy Seals, supported by other forces, stormed the suspected 
residence, killed Osama bin Laden, and buried him in the Arabian Sea within 
hours. 
Although this action was hailed as a major anti-terrorism success, it imme-
diately raised doubts about the future direction of policy in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan. Would this action quicken the Obama administration's departure 
from Afghanistan because of increased domestic and international pressure? 
Since Pakistan was not informed of this American covert raid, partly due to 
suspicion over possible ties between the Pakistan military and intelligence 
forces with terrorist forces, would this rupture ties with Pakistan? Indeed, 
the Pakistan government protested vigorously over the intrusion into its na-
tion's sovereignty without its permission. Further, would the discovery of 
Osama bin Laden in this garrison town within one mile of a Pakistan military 
base turn the American Congress away from the continued aid packages for 
Pakistan? In all, and ironically, would the future anti-terrorism policy ofthe 
Obama administration become more complicated in the months and years 
ahead in Afghanistan and Pakistan, despite this killing? 
North Korea 
In keeping with Candidate Obama's commitment to engage with adversar-
ies rather than to confront them, President Obama followed this course with 
North Korea and Iran during the first two years of his administration, but he 
had little success with either regime with this strategy. 
The Six-Party Talks (among North Korea, South Korea, China, Russia, Ja-
pan, and the United States) were the principal diplomatic vehicle used during 
the Bush administration to address the nuclear issue with North Korea. These 
talks went through seven different "rounds" during the Bush years with lim-
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ited success, as North Korea conducted its first underground nuclear test in 
October 2006. By 2007, however, an apparent agreement was reached on the 
eventual dismantlement of the North Korean nuclear facilities in exchange 
for economic assistance from the United States and others, and for moving 
toward normalization of North Korean relations with several states, including 
the United States (McCormick 2010, 230- 31; "Six Party Talks" 20 I 0). In 
2008, however, the implementation of that agreement became stalled as each 
side accused the other of not fulfilling its commjtment. By early 2009, North 
Korea announced that it was ending its military and political agreement with 
South Korea ("North Korea Conducts Nuclear Test" 2009), and the seeming 
progress on denuclearization of the Korean peninsula was halted. 
A new North Korean approach was dramatically evident within the first 
few months of the Obama administration taking office. On virtually the 
same day in April 2009 that President Obama was calling for a nuclear-free 
world in a major foreign policy address in Prague, North Korea conducted a 
missile test that appeared to be a violation of earlier sanctions. A little more 
than a month later, North Korea conducted a second nuclear test. That action 
precipitated the United Nations Security Council to enact new sanctions on 
North Korea. These sanctions tightened restrictions on imports and exports 
of military-related hardware to North Korea and called on UN members "to 
inspect and destroy all banned cargo to and from that country--on the high 
seas, at seaports and airports- if they have reasonable grounds to suspect a 
violation" (United Nations Security Council 2009). Such inspections, how-
ever, remained voluntary on the part of states (and hence weakened their 
overall impact), although these sanctions were described as "unprecedented" 
at the time (MacAskill2009). Near the end of2009, the administration's spe-
cial representative for North Korean policy, Ambassador Stephen Bosworth, 
traveled to North Korea to try to get that country back to the Six-Party Talks, 
but his effort did not succeed (United States Department of State 20 I 0). 
The administration's efforts at engaging North Korea continued to deterio-
rate in 2010, and as a result, the administration's approach turned increasingly 
toward placing more sanctions on that regime. In March, a South Korean 
warship was sunk, killing some forty-six sailors. After an investigation, it 
was determined that North Korea was responsible for this action. In July 
2010, the United Nations Security Council issued a "Presidential Statement" 
condemning this attack, although not specifically identifying North Korea as 
responsible for the incident (United Nations Security Council 2010). A short 
time after that, the Obama administration announced new unilateral economic 
sanctions against North Korea as yet another way to "tighten the financial 
vise" around the North Korean leadership, and Secretary of State Hillary Clin-
ton announced that the United States would not engage in negotiations with 
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North Korea until it agreed to abandon its nuclear weapons program (LandJer 
and Bumiller 20 I 0). In late November, the situation had deteriorated further 
with the revelation that North Korea had built a new facility for processing 
uranium (Sanger 20 I 0) and with the North Korean shelling of a South Korean 
island, killing both civilian and military personnel (McDonald 20 I 0). In all , 
the Obama admffijstration's effort at engaging the North Koreans, and using 
increased bilateral and multilateral sanctions to prod them to return to negotia-
tions, had not succeeded in its first two years as measured by one important 
indicator: no new rounds of the Six-Party Talks were held in 2009 or 20 l 0. 
Indeed, the North Koreans have been seeking such a meeting, but the Obama 
administration, reminiscent of the Bush administration approach, has declined 
until North Korea's behavior changes (Landler 2010). 
Iran 
A simjJar lack of progress has occurred in efforts to engage Iran diplomati-
cally over its nuclear ambitions. Over the past decade, Iran has been subject 
to numerous critical reports from the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(JAEA) due to its failure to adhere fully to the safeguards agreement required 
under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Bush adnllnistration was 
initially reluctant to engage in direct talks with Iran and instead sought to 
isolate and sanction the regime (including three rounds of sanctions passed 
by the United Nations Security Council). By 2006, the Bush administration 
did participate in the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United 
States, and the United Kingdom) talks with Iran and offered Iran a series of 
incentives for cooperating with the IAEA and for forgoing its enrichment and 
reprocessing activities (Arms Control Association 20 I 0). No breakthrough 
occurred, however. 
Nonetheless, the Obama administration sought to build on this diplomatic 
start. American officials met with Iran through the P5+ I process in October 
2009, albeit without notable success. Similarly, an offer by the United States, 
France, and Russia to provide a plan for providing nuclear fuel assemblies 
for its research reactor with international safeguards was not accepted by 
Iran. Instead, Iran continued its nuclear enrichment activities. As a result, the 
Obama administration turned to impose additional sanctions on that country 
in an effort to isolate it internationally. 
By the middle of 2010, the Obama administration succeeded in getting 
several additional sanctions placed on Iran. First, the United Nations Security 
Council passed a fourth set of sanctions against Iran in early June (Macfarqu-
har 2010b). These sanctions largely focused on military, trade, and financial 
actions taken by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards in Iran, since this group 
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plays a key role in the country's nuclear program. Second, the administra-
tion also obtained new unilateral American sanctions through congressional 
legislation later that month (Cornwell 20 I 0). Those sanctions endeavored to 
restrict foreign banks that deal with Iranian banks or with the Islamic Revo-
lutionary Guards from gaining access to the American fmancial system and 
sought to restrict gasoline suppliers from providing much-needed fuel to Iran 
(despite an abundance of oil, Iran has limited refining capacity). Finally, the 
European Union in late July 2010 imposed an additional series of economic 
sanctions on Iran (Castle 20 I 0). Such sanctions were particularly important, 
since the EU has such a large amount of trade with Iran. 
According to the administration's strategy, these sanctions were to alter 
Iran's "cost-benefit" calculation in pursuing nuclear weapons development. 
By seeking to engage Iran, promoting a norm of nuclear nonproliferation, 
and imposing economic sanctions, the administration sought to compel Iran 
to agree to negotiations over its nuclear weapons ambitions. In late summer 
of20 I 0, President Obama insisted that this approach was working (Ambinder 
20 I 0), although no immediate negotiations were forthcoming. Near the end 
of the year, however, some movement appeared as a meeting between the 
PS+ I and Iran was scheduled for early December. The prospects of a real 
breakthrough at such a meeting, however, looked dim. The more likely out-
come was for continued stalemate between the two sides ("Official: Iran, 
West Agree on Timing of Nuke Talks" 2010; Dahl 2010). Moreover, the 
December meeting in Geneva produced exactly that result, although the two 
sides agreed to meet again in Istanbul, Turkey, in January of 20 II (Erlanger 
20 I 0), but the meeting, too, did not produce a breakthrough. 
CONFRONTING THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT 
The administration's engagement efforts in seeking progress to resolve the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict has produced a bit more movement than those with 
North Korea and Iran, but no significant breakthrough has occurred so far. 
When the Obama administration assumed office, discussions between the two 
parties had broken off after an Israeli military offensive against Gaza in late 
2008 in which at least fourteen hundred people were killed, some five thou-
sand injured, and numerous homes, schools, and other buildings destroyed 
(UN News Service 20 I 0). As a result, prospects for any direct talks between 
the two parties were slim, and the new Obama administration decided to pur-
sue a different tack in the short term. 
Embracing the Bush administration 's Middle East goal of creating a two-
state solution to the conflict, the Obama administration's initial strategy was 
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to propose the use of "proximity talks" with the Israelis and Palestinians as 
a vehicle to restart direct negotiations (Prasher 20 I 0). Under the proximity 
proposal, the United States, and particularly Senator George Mitchell, the 
US Middle East envoy, would meet with the Israelis and the Palestinians 
separately and seek to improve the "atmosphere for negotiations" between 
the parties as a way of moving back to direct negotiations between the parties 
(United States Department of State 2009b). Both parties eventually agreed 
to the American proposal, and proximity talks went on for several months, 
albeit not without difficulties, especially over Israel building settlements on 
land seized in the Six-Day War. Nonetheless, the administration's persistence 
paid off. On September I, 20 I 0, President Obama was able to announce that 
direct negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians would be resumed 
(Obama 20 I 0). The parties also informed the president that they thought they 
could complete their negotiations within one year. In these negotiations, the 
Israelis and Palestinians would have responsibility for them, but the Obama 
administration would continue to assist them in their discussions. 
Even as these negotiations were being launched, though, skepticism re-
mained over the prospect for success. That skepticism increased as the Israeli 
government announced in early November 2010 that it would build thirteen 
hundred new housing units in East Jerusalem. This announcement brought 
condemnation from the United States, and the Palestinian negotiator charged 
that such action was "destroying the peace process" (Mitnick 20 I Oa). A few 
days later, the Israeli government announced that it was freezing settlements 
for three months as part of a bargain for military aid and diplomatic support 
from the United States (Mitnick 2010b), although that deal was later aban-
doned by the Obama administration (De Young 201 0). Instead, the adminis-
tration reverted to the use of "indirect talks" between the parties by Middle 
East Envoy George Mitchell, an approach initially adopted by the administra-
tion at the beginning of its term ("U.S. Tries Indirect Peace Tactic" 20 I 0). In 
this sense, the Middle East peace efforts had come full circle in two years, 
without notable success. 
RESTARTING RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA 
One area where the Obama administration achieved foreign policy success 
was in improving relations with Russia. From the beginning of its term, the 
administration focused on this relationship, and it has succeeded in advanc-
ing both bilateral and multilateral cooperation with Russia. The center of this 
reset effort was the signing of the New START Treaty in April 20 I 0, but sev-
eral other cooperative efforts also mark the relationship during the first two 
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years of the Obama administration. In this sense, relations with Russia mark 
a significant change in policy substance and in policy success as compared 
to the Bush years. 
By the end of the Bush administration, American relations with Russia 
had deteriorated, in part over the American (and NATO-endorsed) decision 
on deploying a missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic and 
over the Russian intervention into the South Ossetia region of Georgia in 
the summer of 2008 ("NATO to Back US Missile Defence" 2008; "Russia 's 
Medvedev Hails 'Comrade' Obama" 2009). The Russians saw the missile 
defense system aimed at them, rather than at Iran, as argued by the Bush 
administration, and the Americans saw the Russian actions in Georgia as an 
effort to undermine the independence of the former Soviet republic. In this 
wary political environment between these two powers, the Obama adminis-
tration nevertheless set out to reset relations with Russia. 
The first meeting between President Obama and President Dmitry Medve-
dev occurred at the G-20 meeting in London in April 2009 and produced im-
mediate results. Medvedev characterized Obama as "totally different" from 
Bush and noted the positive nature of their exchanges. Obama noted "real 
differences" with Russia on some important issues, but he acknowledged that 
there was "a broad set of common interests that we can pursue" ("Russia's 
Medvedev Hails 'Comrade' Obama" 2009). Significantly, both leaders is-
sued a statement that they would begin negotiations on a new agreement "on 
reducing and limiting strategic offensive arms to replace the START Treaty" 
(White House, Office of the Press Secretary 2009d), and President Obama 
agreed to visit Moscow the following July. 
At that July summit, Presidents Obama and Medvedev took further steps 
to improve the relationship. The two leaders announced the creation of a Bi-
lateral Presidential Commission between Russia and the United States. This 
commission would consist of thirteen different working groups. The initial 
working groups ranged widely- from ones focused on nuclear energy and 
nuclear security, arms control and international security, foreign policy and 
fighting terrorism to others focused on energy and the environment, health, 
space cooperation, and educational and cultural exchanges. Importantly, too, 
Obama and Medvedev also announced that Russia and America would work 
on cooperative efforts to address the issue of defense against the pro I iferation 
of ballistic missiles (see White House, Office of the Press Secretary 2009b, 
2009c, and the United States Department of State 2009a on the commission 
and ballistic missile defense). 
In mid-September 2009, the Obama administration announced an impor-
tant change in the Bush administration 's European missile defense plan. Un-
der the revised Obama missile plan, the United States would not station radars 
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in the Czech Republic or place ten ballistic missile interceptors in Poland. 
Instead the administration decided on a ten-year phased deployment of mis-
sile defense, beginning with a sea-based deployment and a transportable radar 
surveillance system. The target of this new missile defense plan would be 
short- and medium-range missiles, particularly those under development by 
Iran, with less focus on long-range missiles from that country (White House, 
Office of the Press Secretary 2009a). This change was seen by some as a 
concession to Russia, since such a system could be viewed as Jess threatening 
to Russia than the Bush plan, although the Russian response was somewhat 
mixed to this change (see Young 2009). 
The cooperative relationship continued over the next year, and by June 
2010, on the occasion of President Medvedev' s visit to the White House, the 
Obama administration issued a "reset" fact sheet lauding the extent of coop-
eration between the two nations (White House, Office of the Press Secretary 
20 I 0). And, indeed, there were numerous bilateral and multilateral actions that 
the United States and Russia had addressed. On bilateral issues, the United 
States and Russia worked on moving Russia toward accession in the World 
Trade Organization; collaborated on addressing the global financial crisis; 
agreed to a new energy initiative; pursued military cooperation (including 
allowing ground and air transit of forces and supplies bound for Afghanistan 
through Russian territory); and fostered state-to-state cooperation to promote 
more open governance, democracy, and human rights. On multilateral issues, 
the United States and Russia cooperated on passing a new set of sanctions on 
Iran through the UN Security Council (and, in accord with that resolution, 
Russia agreed not to ship S-300 missiles to Iran), approving a new sanctioning 
resolution through the United Nations over North Korea' s second nuclear test, 
pursuing stability and the restoration of democracy in Kyrgyzstan after the 
violence there in summer 20 I 0, and developing some "confidence building" 
measures over dealing with Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia. 
All of these efforts (including numerous nongovernmental activities) reflect 
the change in the Russian-American relationship, but none appeared as crucial 
in reestablishing this relationship as the New START Treaty. This treaty (with 
its name a play on words to convey the changing ties) would require Russia 
and the United States to reduce their deployed nuclear delivery vehicles (in-
tercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched missiles, and long-range 
bombers) by about 50 percent from the previous limit in the 1991 START 
Treaty (see McCormick 2010, 166) to eight hundred in total, with a maximum 
of seven hundred such vehicles deployed (New START Treaty 20 I 0). It would 
also require each side to reduce the number of nuclear warheads to I,550. 
Such a total would represent a reduction of about 30 percent from the maxi-
mum level allowed under the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT) 
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of 2002 (Arms Control Association 2002). The Obarna administration viewed 
this treaty as not only important in improving the bilateral relationship but also 
as important in advancing its larger nuclear nonproliferation goal. By the end 
of2010, the US Senate had recommended ratification of this treaty, and this 
centerpiece ofObarna's US-Russian and nonproliferation agenda had become 
a notable foreign policy success for the administration. 
INITIATING GLOBAL COMMON ISSUES 
In addition to American-Russian relations, global common issues have also 
been an important area where the Obama administration has moved beyond 
the agenda of the previous administration with its own initiatives. Nuclear 
nonproliferation, global financial reform, and climate change represent espe-
cially new departures by the Obama administration, but policy success with 
these initiatives remains elusive so far. 
Nonproliferation 
Although the New START Treaty represents one aspect of the Obama ad-
ministration's nonproliferation activities, the administration has a much 
broader agenda in this area. The administration is pursuing at least three other 
initiatives to promote nuclear nonproliferation. The first involves the Obama 
administration's new directives on when nuclear weapons would be used by 
the United States. Specifically, the administration committed the United States 
to refraining from using nuclear weapons against those nonnuclear states that 
are parties to the NPT and those states that are fully in compliance with NPT 
requirements. If these nonnuclear states were to utilize biological and chemi-
cal weapons against the United States, the American response would generally 
be with conventional weapons (although a slight opening remains for a nuclear 
response in exceptional cases). Toward nuclear weapons states and those 
states not in compliance with the NPT, the potential use of nuclear weapons 
would remain, but such use would occur "only in extreme circumstances to 
defend the vital interests of the United States, our allies and partners" (Nuclear 
Posture Review Report 20 l 0, ix; Nuclear Posture Review Briefing 20 l 0). In 
essence, then, the administration was seeking to move toward a more stable 
nuclear-use policy and encourage other states in this direction as well. 
The second initiative was President Obarna's decision to convene the 
Washington Nuclear Security Summit in April 2010 with forty-seven coun-
tries in attendance. The goal of that summit was to address how best "to 
prevent terrorist, criminals, or other unauthorized actors from acquiring 
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nuclear materials" that may be available today. The summit ended with a 
communique, a commitment to meet this goal within four years, a work plan 
for the future, and an agreement to meet again in 2012 ("Communique of the 
Washington Nuclear Security Summit" 2010). All of these commitments, 
however, were voluntary, and some potential or existing nuclear states (e.g., 
Iran and North Korea) and potential proliferators were not invited ("The 
Nuclear Security Summit" 201 0). Still, this initiative is an important first 
step, and it remains largely a work in progress. 
The third initiative focused on a reaffirmation of the world's commitment 
to nonproliferation at the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Review Confer-
ence. After some four weeks of debate and discussion among the conferees in 
May 2010, the review meeting did announce two important agreements: the 
189 signatories to the NPT reaffirmed their commitment to it, and the parties 
agreed to a 2012 deadline for a Middle East conference to address unconven-
tional weapons in that part of the world (MacFarquhar 20 lOa). Although the 
Middle East conference actually taking place seems doubtful in light of the 
ongoing conflict in that region, the reaffirmation of the NPT provides im-
portant support for the Obama administration's efforts to advance its nuclear 
nonproliferation agenda. 
Financial Reform 
Global financial reform was a second global commons initiative advanced by 
the Obama administration. This initiative was driven in large part by the dif-
ficult economic environment that President Obama inherited as he assumed 
the presidency. The goal of this reform is to create a sounder financial system 
by standardizing banking regulations and regulating the various investment 
instruments used worldwide. The principal forum that the Obama administra-
tion has been using to make progress on this issue has been the G-20 sum-
mits. The American effort actually began with the G-20 Washington Summit 
in late 2008 at the end of the Bush administration, but it has been continued 
at the subsequent G-20 summits in London and Pittsburgh in 2009 and in 
Toronto and Seoul in 2010. A global framework has now been outlined to 
regulate global banking capital and reserve requirements, as noted at the G-20 
Summit in Seoul, but the new framework will only start to be implemented in 
2013. Importantly, though, the framework will still need to be incorporated 
into national law by the states involved. Further, there remain other areas 
of work, as well, such as developing a common framework on dealing with 
financial institutions that are "too big to fail" and protecting taxpayers from 
bearing these costs (see "Complete Text: G-20 Seoul Communique'' 2010). 
Finally, differences remain over the regulation of some financial instruments, 
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such as hedge funds, with the European states seeking much greater control 
of such instruments than the United States (Schneider and Cho 20 10). 
Climate Change 
American policy on climate change under the Obama administration further 
represents a significant change from the Bush administration. Indeed, the 
administration came to office with a substantial commitment to lead inter-
national environmental change and took a number of initial steps at home 
to promote that agenda. Early on, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton (2009a) 
appointed a special envoy for climate change as a way to advance this agenda 
within the government. The administration also advanced a "green jobs" 
agenda at home, included some $80 billion in the 2009 stimulus package 
to address energy issues, and announced new emission standards for new 
vehicles built for 2017 through 2025 (Stern 20 10). Further, the administra-
tion was successful in getting the House of Representatives (although not the 
Senate) to pass a "cap-and-trade" bill, which would have imposed mandatory 
limits on the emission of greenhouse gases and encouraged the use of cleaner 
energy sources for the future (Carey 2009). 
With these domestic initiatives in place, the administration seemed well po-
sitioned to argue for significant global reform at the United Nations Confer-
ence on Climate Change in Copenhagen, Denmark, in December 2009. Yet, 
this was not to be. President Obama personally attended the meeting of 192 
countries, and he worked tirelessly to broker the divide between developed 
and developing countries on an international accord or even a commitment to 
a legally binding agreement. What was ultimately achieved was a three-page 
agreement among China, India, Brazil, and South Africa in which a commit-
ment was made to assist developing countries in adapting to climate change 
($30 billion a year through 2012, and a total of$100 billion by 2020). Further, 
a commitment was also made to limit the increase in the global temperature to 
below two degrees Celsius. Yet, these commitments were political statements 
only, and they did not include any means of enforcement. Although President 
Obama contended that the agreement was a "breakthrough," he also acknowl-
edged that "this progress alone is not enough" (Broder 2009). 
As the Obama administration moved to the next scheduled international 
conference on climate change in Cancun, Mexico, in late November to mid-
December 20 I 0, the prospects for success did not appear bright. The outcome 
of that meeting was described as "modest," although sufficient to continue 
the international effort in the year ahead (Broder 20 I 0). Still, environmental 
legislation is highly unlikely with the new political composition of the US 
House and Senate, and it appears unlikely that the United States can meet its 
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financial obligations to aid the developing countries in light of the large bud-
get deficits and economic problems at home. Nonetheless, prior to the Can-
cun meeting, the administration's special envoy for climate change pledged 
to press forward with its agenda (Eilperin 2010), and afterward, this envoy 
described Cancun as "a significant step forward that builds on the progress 
made in Copenhagen" (Broder 201 0). In all, though, success with this initia-
tive remains extremely modest. 
CONCLUSION 
The Obama administration came to office promising foreign policy change, 
but the degree of change so far has been limited. In outlining a liberal-
internationalist foreign policy approach, the Obama administration has surely 
achieved change from the approach followed by the Bush administration. In 
seeking to implement that approach- whether evaluated through the changes 
in the substance of American policy or through the achievements that it has 
had- the Obama administration has had much less success. In this sense, 
continuity in several foreign policy arenas remains more prevalent than 
change during the first two years of the Obama administration. 
Indeed, several areas reflect considerable continuity. For instance, the 
Obama administration made an initial attempt to infuse domestic values into 
foreign policy with its three executive orders on the treatment of terrorist sus-
pects, but the most visible symbol of the Bush policy--Guantanamo Bay-
remains open and military commissions continue, as well. President Obama's 
personal popularity initially softened America's image abroad as compared to 
the Bush years, but that new "soft power" has not been translated very easily 
into support for American foreign policy. Further, on major security issues, 
with the exception of ending the Iraq War, the Obama administration's policy 
reflects more continuity than change-whether addressing the Afghanistan 
War, the Middle East, or the nuclear threats from North Korea and Iran. In-
deed, the strategy of engagement with North Korea and Iran has not yielded 
success; instead, relations with both countries appear to have eroded. 
Still, the Obama administration has initiated some substantive foreign 
policy changes, and in at least one area, it has achieved notable success. The 
Obama administration has begun to address a number of global common is-
sues with new policy approaches- whether global financial reform, climate 
change, or nuclear nonproliferation. The degree of success in each of these 
areas remains unclear, but these policies do represent new departures from 
the Bush years. Finally, and importantly, Obama's strategy of engagement 
with Russia has had a substantial effect in improving that relationship and a 
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New START Treaty is a crucial consequence of the "reset" in relations with 
that country. 
In all, though, these foreign policy results are modest, especially for a "big 
bang presidency," as Steven Schier characterizes the Obama administration's 
approach to the office in the introduction to this volume. In this sense, the 
Obama administration's foreign policy is still largely a "work in progress," as 
one analysis described it (Pershing 201 0), or one with lots of "big ideas" but 
one short on implementation, as another summarized it (Ignatius 20 I 0). Yet, 
the Obama administration will find the political landscape over the next two 
years hardly favorable for implementing its foreign policy approach. With 
the shift to Republican control of the US House of Representatives and the 
lessening of Democratic control in the US Senate after the 20 I 0 congressional 
elections, and with the increasingly threatening international environment-
whether from the difficulties in the Afghan War, a more assertive North Korea, 
or the continuing actions of Iran (or perhaps elsewhere)--the administration 
will likely find it difficult to continue its liberal internationalist agenda, much 
as the Clinton administration found after the 1994 congressional elections. In 
this sense, foreign policy change may be in the air for the Obama administra-
tion, but perhaps not in the way that it had originaJiy intended. 
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